

Price Norms and Consumer Behaviour

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Introduction

- Pricing in retail markets is characterized by rigid regular prices and deep sales (Bils & Klenow 2004, Nakamura & Steinsson, 2008)
- Standard view of sales is price discrimination across heterogeneous rational consumers (Varian 1980)
 - even for repeated purchase of durable goods (Hendel & Nevo 2013)
- An alternative view is that valuation is unstable: experiencing high regular prices boosts valuation of the good on sale, by drawing attention to its low price (BGS 2013, 2020)
- Can we empirically distinguish these mechanisms? Are memory and attention quantitatively important in explaining demand?

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- Can we empirically distinguish these mechanisms? Are memory and attention quantitatively important in explaining demand?

Overview

- Data and some facts about demand
- Model
- Testing novel predictions
- Estimation

Data

- Large UK retail chain (approx. 600 large stores)
- Scanner data for all stores, over two years (March 2015 – March 2017)
- ~ 15mln consumers with loyalty cards, 800mln shopping trips
- Unit of observation: consumer i buys good j , at price p , time t , store s
 - Product characteristics (price, brand, type, size or weight)
 - Loyalty card information
 - panel structure
 - demographics: gender, age, household size, post code

Memory, Attention and Choice (BGS 2020)

- Cues that bring high (low) prices to mind boost (dampen) demand

Model of memory and attention in choice BGS (2020):

- 1 choice to buy (p, q) cues retrieval of norm p^n from memory
 - retrieval based on similarity (Kahana 2012)
 - Memory acts as a reference for valuation
- 2 If salient difference between p and p^n : contrast p away from p^n
- 3 If no salient difference between p and p^n : assimilate p to p^n

$$u(q, p) = q - p^n - (p - p^n)\sigma(p, p^n)$$

- Saliency function σ captures attention drawn to $p - p^n$

This Paper

Empirically assess the role of consumers' price memory in choices:

- Use large dataset from UK retailer, covering universe of transactions over 2 years
- Heterogeneity in consumers' norms comes from variation in exposure to prices and to cues

Find systematic instability of valuation from memory-based norms

- sensitivity to differences from the norm double that to changes in price levels
- effect concentrated in large price changes; small price variation is neglected
- normatively irrelevant cues impact price sensitivity
- variables that might matter for price discrimination (inventory, income) have little effect

Contrast effects:

- Lab choices (Tversky & Simonhson, 1995), rentals (Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 1999), speed dating (Barghava & Fishman, 2014), interviews (Schiprowski & Radbruch, 2021)

Empirical estimation of models of sales:

- Pesendorfer (2002), Boizot Robin Vissier (2004), Hendel Nevo (2006, 2013)
- Gentry Pesendorfer (2018), Mazumdar et al (2005)

Relative to this literature, we document:

- Role of memory: norms mediated by contextual cues, ex post
- Role of attention: contrast for large differences, neglect for small ones

The Model

Price Database and Cues

Database: good and time specific distribution $D_t(p)$

- Hedonic experiences of prices p up to time t
- Assume that p is bimodal: either regular p_r , or sale p_s
- if share of p_r is η then $\bar{p} = (1 - \eta)p_s + \eta p_r$

Cues k_t : features of the choice setting that selective retrieve similar past experiences: reminders of regular price or of sale events

Price norm: average experience in D_t weighted by similarity to k_t

$$p^n(k_t) = (1 - \eta(k_t))p_s + \eta(k_t)p_r = \bar{p} + \Delta\eta(p_r - p_s)$$

where $\Delta\eta = \eta(k_t) - \eta > 0$ if cue is more similar to p_r

- Given norm p^n , valuation is $u(q, p) = q - V(p, p^n)$ where

$$V(p, p^n) = p^n + (p - p^n)\sigma(p, p^n)$$

- refer to $p - p^n$ as surprise
- $\sigma(p, p^n)$ is a salience function (BGS 2012, 2013, 2020)
 - homogeneous of degree zero, bounded by $\Sigma > 1$
 - large surprises attract attention $\sigma > 1$, small surprises are neglected $\sigma < 1$

Empirical Approach

- Replacing $p^n(k_t) = \bar{p} + \Delta\eta(p_r - p_s)$ in V yields:

$$V \approx \bar{p} + (p - \bar{p}) \sigma(p, \bar{p}) - \Delta\eta(p_r - p_s) K(p, \bar{p})$$

where


- $\Delta\eta = \eta(k_t) - \eta > 0$ if cue k_t disproportionately retrieves p_r
 - $K(p, \bar{p}) > 1$ if $\sigma(p, \bar{p}) > 1$
- Suggests the strategy:

1. Neglect differences in similarity in memory ($\Delta\eta = 0$) and examine role of attention

$$V = \bar{p} + (p - \bar{p})\sigma(p, \bar{p})$$

2. Then consider cues with clear similarity structure (sign $\Delta\eta$)


The role of attention



- Inattention to small price changes, overreaction to large ones

Cues and instability of valuation

- Conversely, for given p and \bar{p} , valuation depends on cue k_t
- if k_t retrieves regular prices (sales) $\rightarrow p^n$ increases (drops)
- Valuation increases in p^n if $\sigma > 1$ (contrast) but decreases if $\sigma < 1$ (assimilation)



Summing Up

- 1 Consumers neglect price variation close to the average price they experienced
- 2 Consumers react strongly to large price changes relative to experienced prices
- 3 Contextual cues can move norms away from the average price, causing overreaction

Empirical Analysis

Approach

- For each individual i extract price databases for each good j over time
 - assess variation in average prices \bar{p} and surprises $p - \bar{p}$

- Estimate the model in a flexible discrete choice approach

$$u(q, p) = q - \bar{p} - (p - \bar{p})\sigma(p, \bar{p}) + \Delta\eta(p_r - p_s)K(p, \bar{p})$$

- Test distinctive predictions of memory and attention mechanisms

Individual price databases

- Define individual i 's price database for product j at time t

$$D_{ijt} = \{p_{jt} \mid i \text{ visited store at } t' < t\}$$

- Summarize database by average price seen:

$$\bar{p}_{ijt} = E[p_{jt'} \mid p_{jt'} \in D_{ijt}, t' \text{ in last 80 days}]$$

- To capture recency in recall, truncate distant experiences
- Assuming each visit entails experience may overstate the latter
 - this still entails large variation in norms
 - results robust to restricting database to purchases only

Variation in price databases

Table 2: Experienced Prices and Surprises, Pooled Across Products

Variable	Mean	Sd	P10	P25	P50	P75	P90
Experienced Price (normalized)	1.00	0.097	0.85	0.98	1.00	1.05	1.10
Price Surprise (normalized)	0.00	0.11	-0.17	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.11

*Experienced price is normalized by dividing the experienced price by the average experienced price of the shopper*product combination. Price surprise is normalized by dividing the surprise value by the price norm in each trip. Column summary statistics pool all shopper trips together.*

- Databases vary over time, due to price changes
- Databases also vary across consumers [▶▶ example](#)
 - exogenous variation reflecting timing of visits to the supermarket
 - typically accounts for $> 1/4$ of total variance of \bar{p}_{ijt} [▶▶ hist](#)

Estimation

Mixed logit model:

$$\mu_{ijt} = \phi_i^n \bar{p}_{ijt} + \phi_i^s (p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}) + \alpha_{ij} \tau_j + \alpha_i^p c_{ijt} + \alpha_i^{hh} f(X_{it}) + \epsilon_{ij}$$

- $\phi_i^X \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{\phi}^X, \sigma_X^2)$ heterogeneity in sensitivity to price terms
- τ_j intercept captures fixed characteristics of good j , allows taste heterogeneity with random coefficients α_{ij} (Dube et al 2020)
- $c_{ijt} = 1$ if i bought good j before
- X_{it} are household characteristics, including inventory ▶ inventory
- $\epsilon_{ij} \sim iid$ extreme value
- set outside option to $\mu_{i0t} = 0$ (static model)

Baseline Result

Table 3: Baseline Results

	Panel A: Mean Estimates			Panel B: Variance Estimates		
	(rat)	(baseline)	(alt)	(rat)	(baseline)	(alt)
Price	-1.58***			0.13***		
Pricenorm		-0.57***	-1.44***		0.07**	0.38***
Price-Pricenorm		-1.77***	-1.83***		0.27***	0.14***
Price * Inventory	-0.01***	-0.01***		0.01***	0.01***	
Price * Inventory'			0.01***			3.27***

- Past prices help predict choice, contrast dominates $|\phi_t^s| > |\phi_i^n|$
 - Sensitivity to surprises 2 to 3 times as large as to price levels
 - in (Alt), database restricted to purchases, similar results
- Inventory dampens demand but does not affect main result

- Definition of norms
 - all visits vs purchase only
 - different implementations of recency (past 80 to 120 days, last 7 to 10 visits)
 - directly assessing role of past prices [» table](#)
- Proxying for consideration sets: restricting choice to goods bought by consumer
- Dynamics in reduced form: outside option given by price expectations fitted to $AR(n)$ process

Rational Channels

In the model, past prices directly affect valuation. But past prices can also drive current demand by shaping the outside option:

- current inventory (controlled for)
- expectations about future prices (Handel & Nevo, 2013)

Crucial distinction: selective attention entails assimilation for small price surprises

- 1 Valuation may decrease with norm
- 2 Elasticity of demand is small around the norm, and large far from the norm

Mechanism: Contrast and Assimilation

- Contrast for large surprises, assimilation for small surprises
- Piece-wise linear specification:

$$u_{ijt} = \phi_i^n \bar{p}_{ijt} + \phi_i^{S,s} \cdot S \cdot (p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}) + \dots$$

where $S \in \{Low, Mid, High\}$ is a dummy for the level of percentage surprise

- $S = Low$ for $\frac{p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}}{\bar{p}_{ijt}} < -0.07$ (bottom 25pctile of surprises)
- $S = High$ for $\frac{p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}}{\bar{p}_{ijt}} > 0.07$ (top 10pctile of surprises)
- Robust to other thresholds, e.g. 5%

Results: Contrast and Assimilation

Table 4: Contrast and Assimilation


	Panel A: Mean Estimates			Panel B: Variance Estimates		
	(rat)	(baseline)	(alt)	(rat)	(baseline)	(alt)
Pricenorm	-0.57***	-0.56***	-1.41***	0.07***	0.11***	0.42***
Price-Pricenorm	-1.77***			0.27***		
(Price-Pricenorm) * Low		-2.05***	-1.74***		0.07**	0.13***
(Price-Pricenorm) * Mid		0.92***	-0.54***		0.78***	0.01
(Price-Pricenorm) * High		-1.50***	-1.87***		0.31	0.19***
Price * Inventory	-0.01***	-0.01***		0.01***	0.01***	
Price * Inventory'			0.01***			0.00

- Valuation increases with norm (contrast) for large surprises, $\phi_i^{High,Low,s} / \phi_i^n > 1$ (where ϕ^s / ϕ^n proxies for σ)
- Valuation drops with norm (assimilation) for small surprises, $\phi_i^{Mid,s} / \phi_i^n < 1$

Norms and Price Elasticity

Consider the demand for (q, p) given (q, p^n) in a logit model of discrete choice

- If (q, p^n) is the outside option (red line): $\frac{e^{q-p}}{e^{q-p} + e^{q-p^n}}$
- If (q, p^n) is also the norm (blue line): $\frac{e^{q-V(p,p^n)}}{e^{q-V(p,p^n)} + e^{q-p^n}}$
- Qualitatively similar for more general mixed logit




Norms and Price Elasticity

To compute elasticity, use experimental price variation ($\pm 10\%$) in products treated in the experiment [▶ experiment](#)

- Sort consumers into norm bins of \bar{p} around modal price p
- Compute demand $D(p', \bar{p})$ for each $p' \in \{0.9p, p, 1.1p\}$ and elasticity

$$\frac{P}{D(p, \bar{p})} \frac{D(p, \bar{p}) - D(p', \bar{p})}{p - p'}$$

- Plot average elasticity as a function of norm bin \bar{p}



Cues and instability of valuation

- Norms are not mechanically determined by the database, rather they depend on cues

$$p^n(k_t) = \bar{p} + \Delta\eta(p_r - p_s)$$

where $\Delta\eta$ measures the impact of cues selective retrieval

We consider two naturally occurring cues:

- 1 When good j is on sale, its regular price is shown $\rightarrow \Delta\eta > 0$.
 - inflates utility to buy at p provided $\sigma > 1$
- 2 When goods similar to j are on sale, it reminds consumers of j 's sales price $\rightarrow \Delta\eta < 0$
 - deflates utility to buy at p provided $\sigma > 1$

Cueing the Regular Price

- Specification:

$$u_{ijt} \sim \bar{p}_{ijt} + (p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}) + Sale_j \cdot (p_{j,r} - p_{j,s}) + \dots$$

where $Sale_j$ is a dummy = 1 when j is on sale

Table 5: Cueing the Regular Price

	Panel A: Mean Estimates		Panel B: Variance Estimates	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pricenorm	-0.71***	-0.50***	0.04***	0.14***
Price-Pricenorm	-1.89***	-1.43***	0.48***	0.19***
(Price _{j,r} -Price _{j,s})*Sale _j		0.51***		0.01
Price * Inventory	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***

- Results suggest that sales events raise the price norm, increasing utility of purchase on sale
- Conversely, even given reminder, memory norms play a key role

Cueing Sales

- Specification:

$$\mu_{ijt} \sim \bar{p}_{ijt} + (p_{jt} - \bar{p}_{ijt}) + Sale_{j,sim} \cdot (p_{j,r} - p_{j,s}) + \dots$$

where $Sale_{j,sim}$ is a dummy = 1 when j is at its regular price and similar goods are on sale

- good j is similar to j' if equal in all characteristics but size. Analysis restricted to consumers who only purchase j

Table 6: Cueing Sales

	Panel A: Mean Estimates		Panel B: Variance Estimates	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pricenorm	-0.71***	-0.58***	0.04***	0.13***
Price-Pricenorm	-1.89***	-1.66***	0.48***	0.53***
(Price _{j,r} -Price _{j,s})*Sale _{j,sim}		-0.15**		0.01
Price * Inventory	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***

- Valuation of j is reduced if similar goods j' are on sale

1 Price endogeneity

- Alleviated by using micro data, and randomized prices for 12% of market share
- Variables are not prices but norms and surprises (which are randomized)

2 Could results reflect market segmentation?

- Good fixed effects, substantial variation in norms and surprises within goods **» norms** **» surprises**, extra explanatory power from idiosyncratic variation in norms

3 Not all visits are active choices: partially accounted for with inventory, if anything may dampen results

4 None of these issues explains assimilation or effect of cues

Taking stock

Memory of past experiences directly shapes valuation, in line with bottom up attention

- Large surprises draw attention, overvalued
- Irrelevant cues affect valuation and demand

Memory databases and cues are measurable sources of heterogeneity in choice behavior


- Income effects matter little

Open issues:


- Ideal test of memory: effect of cues depend on database. Can this be documented?
- Calibrate similarity relations and memory process using choice data
- alternatives of choice can also shape attention to attributes
- optimal pricing strategies

Heterogeneity in sales

Sale Depth Vs Sale Frequency




Sale Depth Vs Modal Price




- More expensive teas tend to have larger and more frequent sales

Share of Demand On Sale, Other Products




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Example of Price Database Variation




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Examples of Variation in Surprises Within Goods



Examples of Norm Variation



Inventory


Inventory proxied by:

$$I_{ijt} = \frac{weight_{i,j,prev}}{hhsizes_i * days\ since\ prev\ purchase_{i,j}}$$

Estimation procedure is computationally very intensive

- dataset has approx 32mln rows, for 25k shoppers and 50+1 options
- 110 parameters


Price Changes



- Sales are frequent and large: median is 24%
- Regular price changes are rare, mostly increases, and mostly small: median is 8%

Data Timeline


- **Experiment:** 8 cycles of 21 days (168 days), prices are randomized
- **Pre-treatment:** same length, also starting last Wednesday of April, prices set by the retailer



Price Randomization

We manipulate tea prices within a range of approx. -20% $+20\%$ of baseline price

- 8 cycles of 3 weeks each
- 8 tea products, 12% of top 50 market share



Are past price effects concentrated on the most recent prices?

- prices several visit back still shape choice, but less strongly


Table 7: Recency

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{avg}(p_{n-1}, p_{n-2})$	0.44***			
$\text{avg}(p_{n-3}, p_{n-4})$		0.39***		
$\text{avg}(p_{n-5}, p_{n-6})$			0.15***	
$\text{avg}(p_{n-7}, p_{n-8})$				0.09***
Price	-1.72***	-1.54***	-1.51***	-1.50***
Price * Inventory	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
Choice t-1	3.27***	3.27***	3.48***	3.31***

Another View: Residuals From Linear Regression

Predictability of choice from surprise is easily seen

- Regress demand on price for consumers' modal tea in simple probit model
- Plot regression residuals against price surprise




Seeing Prices


Do consumers look at prices?

Sample: Eye-tracking with 68 consumers, usual tea shoppers

- 63% of consumers look longer than 0.3 secs (threshold to register 0.2s)
- Less time on price with price changes, more on other product attributes



Cross Section Share of Price Norm Variance



Number of Teas Seen Per Purchase

